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Abstract—With the vigorous development of artificial intel-
ligence technology, various engineering technology applications
have been implemented one after another. The gradient descent
method plays an important role in solving various optimization
problems, due to its simple structure, good stability and easy
implementation. In multi-node machine learning system, the
gradients usually need to be shared. Data reconstruction attacks
can reconstruct training data simply by knowing the gradient
information. In this paper, to prevent gradient leakage while
keeping the accuracy of model, we propose the super stochastic
gradient descent approach to update parameters by concealing
the modulus length of gradient vectors and converting it or
them into a unit vector. Furthermore, we analyze the security of
stochastic gradient descent approach. Experiment results show
that our approach is obviously superior to prevalent gradient
descent approaches in terms of accuracy and robustness.
Index Terms—gradient descent, neural network, data recon-
struction attack, differential privacy, distributed machine learn-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
Gradient descent (GD) is a technique to minimize an
objective function, which is parameterized by the parameters
of a model, by updating the parameters with the opposite
direction of the gradient of the objective function about the
parameters [1]. It has widely been applied in solving various
optimization problems because of its simplicity and impressive
generalization ability [2]. But it is born with a heart of re-
vealing privacy. Mathematically, the gradient is the parametric
derivative of the loss function, which is explicitly calculated
from the given training data and its true label. Therefore, an
attacker may extract the sensitive information of the original
training data from the captured gradients. Recently, researches
have shown that an attacker, which captures the gradient of a
training sample, can successfully infer its property [3], tag [4],
class representation [5], [6], or the data input itself [4], [7]–
[9], with high accuracy. In practical deep learning systems,
the gradient of multiple samples is widely used to improve
efficiency and performance, which can also be viewed as
the per-coordinate average of the single-sample gradients. Is
multi-sample gradient safer for the privacy of training data?
Unfortunately, Pan et al. [9] gave the theoretical analysis
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to indicate that multi-sample gradient still leak samples and
labels under certain circumstances.
Since the work of Zhu et al. [7] was proposed, there is
a branch of research [4], [7]–[9] to explore a violent but
universal method for successful data reconstruction attacks,
and some meaningful empirical results are given on Cifar-10
and ImageNet. These works are based on the same learning-
based framework. First, a batch of unknown training samples
are used as variables, and then the optimal training samples
are searched by minimizing the distance between the ground-
truth gradient and the gradient calculated by the variables. The
main difference between them is the choice of minimizing
distance function. L2 and cosine distances are used in [4],
[7] and [8], respectively. Although Zhao et al. [4] used the
properties of neural networks to recover the label of a single
sample prior to the learning-based attack, this technique is only
suitable to single-point gradient. It is same to [7] in the multi-
sample case. Pan et al. [9] gave a theoretical explanation of
information leakage for single sample in a fully connected
neural network with Relu activation function. Furthermore,
they showed that there exists leakage of samples and labels
for multi-samples under certain circumstances by utilizing the
internal information between neurons, and extended the model
to ResNet-18 [10], VGG-11 [11], DenseNet-121 [12], AlexNet
[13], shufflenet v2-x0-5 [14], InceptionV3 [15], GoogLeNet
[16], and MobileNet-V2 [17].
To solving the problem of gradient security, Bonawitz et
al. [18] designed a secure aggregation protocol, Phong et
al. [19] encrypted the gradient before sending it, and Abadi
et al. [20] used differential privacy to protect the gradient.
However, these three methods have their limitations. Secure
aggregation [18] requires the gradient to be an integer, so it is
not compatible with most CNNs. Homomorphic encryption
[19] is only for parameter servers, and differential privacy
[20] protects the gradient while reducing the algorithm’s
performance. Therefore, this paper proposes a new gradient
descent method, super stochastic gradient descent (SSGD) for
achieving neuron-level security while maintaining the accuracy
of model. Moreover, SSGD has stronger robustness. Phong
et al. [19] analyzed the leakage of the input data in single-
layer perceptron with the single-sample and single neuron by






















the leakage of sample data from multi-layer fully connected
neural network gradients using the relu activation function,
and indicated that multiple samples also reveal privacy. There
are two neurons in the last layer which are only activated
by the same single sample. Essentially, the leakage is caused
by attacking the single-sample gradient. SSGD converts the
neuron gradient into a unit vector. This makes that the gradient
aggregation of neurons has super randomness. So the attacker
cannot know the true gradient. Theoretically, SSGD will makes
these attacks invalid, including the attack by searching for the
optimal training sample [4], [7], [8] based on minimizing the
distance between the ground-truth gradient and the gradient
calculated by the variable, and the attack by solving the
equation system [9] to obtain the training data.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose a gradient descent algorithm, called super
stochastic gradient descent. The main idea is update the
parameters by using the unit gradient vector. In neural
networks, neuron parameters are updated by using the
unit gradient vector of neurons.
• We analyze theoretically that SSGD can realize neuron-
level security and defend against data reconstruction
attacks.
• Experimental results show our approach has better ac-
curacy and robustness than prevalent gradient descent
approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the basic gradient descent methods and the data
leakage by gradients. In Section 3, we describe the super
stochastic gradient descent and analyze the safety of our
approach. The experimental results are shown in Section 4.
Finally, we conclude this paper and give the further work.
Some safety experiments are shown in the appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some basic gradient descent algo-
rithms [1], including batch gradient descent (BGD), stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) and mini-batch gradient descent
(MBGD). The difference among them is that how much data
is used to calculate the gradient of the objective function. Then
we describe the information leakage caused by gradients [19].
A. Basic gradient descent algorithms
The BGD is a ordinary form of gradient descent, which
takes the entire training samples into account to calculate the
gradient of the cost function `(θ) about the parameters θ and
then update the parameters by
θ = θ − η · ∇θ`(θ) (1)
where η is the learning rate. The BGD uses the entire training
set in each iteration. Therefore, the update is proceeded in the
right direction, and finally BGD is guaranteed to converge to
the extreme point.
On the contrary, the SGD considers a training sample x(i)
and label y(i) randomly selected from the training set in each
iteration to perform the update of parameters by
θ = θ − η · ∇θ`(θ;x(i); y(i)) (2)
The BGD and SGD are two extremes: one uses all training
samples and the other uses one sample for gradient descent.
Naturally, their advantages and disadvantages are very promi-
nent. For the training speed, the SGD is very fast, and the BGD
can not be satisfactory when the size of training sample set is
large. For accuracy, the SGD determines the direction of the
gradient with only one sample, resulting in a solution which
may not be optimal. For the convergence rate, because the
SGD considers one sample in each iteration and the gradient
direction changes greatly, it cannot quickly converge to the
local optimal solution.
The MBGD is a compromise between BGD and SGD,
which performs an update with a randomly sampled mini-
batch of n training samples by
θ = θ − η · ∇θ`(θ;x(i:i+n); y(i:i+n)) (3)
MBGD decreases the variance of the updates for parameter,
so it has more stable convergence. Moreover, the computing
of gradient about a mini-batch is very efficient by using
highly optimized matrix optimizations existed in advanced
deep learning libraries.
B. Analysis of gradient information leakage
Fig. 1. Single neuron structure
Phong et al. [19] illustrated that how gradients leak the data
information based on a single neuron shown in Fig. 1. Assume
that the d-dimensional vector x ∈ Rd represents data input
with a label value y ∈ R. w ∈ Rd is the weight parameter
and b ∈ R is the bias, represented uniformly by θ = (w, b) ∈
Rd+1. g ∈ Rd+1 is the gradient vector of the parameter θ. f
is an activation function and the loss function `(w, b, x, y) =
(hw,b(x)− y)2, where hw,b(x) = f(
∑d
i=1 wixi + b). Let g =




= 2(hw,b(x)− y)f ′(
d∑
i=1










Therefore, we obtain σk = σ · xk. By solving the system of
equations, we can easily get x and y. Also, we know that g is
determined by (x, y). So g and (x, y) are bijective. When w
and b are known, leaking the gradient g is equivalent to leaking
(x, y). Similarly, protecting g is equivalent to protecting (x, y).
Based on [9] the single-sample analysis of multi-layer neu-
ral networks by using relu activation function, there are also
data leakage problem. Although there is no such simple and
intuitive leakage of data in a multi-layer neural network, we
can still know x and y by analyzing the internal relationship of
the neural network and find that (x, y) and g are still bijective.
III. SUPER STOCHASTIC GRADIENT DESCENT
In this section, we propose our super stochastic gradient
descent approach for preventing gradient leakage while keep-
ing the accuracy, and then analyze in detail the safety of our
approach.
A. Our approach
It was confirmed that the gradient leaks privacy [7], [19].
For solving the security problem caused by the exchange
gradient in stochastic gradient descent or mini-batch gradient
descent, we propose the super stochastic gradient descent
approach, which can protect the gradient information without
losing accuracy by hiding part of the gradient information.
The gradient is the first-order partial derivative of the objective
function, so it is a vector with both magnitude and direction.
We seek the gradient of the objective function to find the
fastest descent direction. But it is little related with the
modulus length of the gradient vector. So we hide the modulus
length of the gradient vector and convert the gradient vector
into a unit vector.
The super-randomness, caused by the aggregation of mul-
tiple unit gradient vectors, may lead to poor results. To
guarantee that this kind of randomness is friendly, we utilize
the following approaches to reduce the uncertainty caused by
super-randomness.
For single sample training sample x(i) and label y(i), we
use unit gradient vector to update parameter θ




For multiple samples, the parameter is updated to








where x(i:i+n) represents n samples and y(i:i+n) denotes their
labels. The gradient ∇θ`(θ;x(i:i+n); y(i:i+n)) of n samples is
considered as a basic gradient, and m is the number of basic
gradients. Aggregating the unit gradient vectors of m basic
gradients on average is to further enhance the stability of the
algorithm. The algorithm has higher performance with strong
randomness. It is secure to share this unit basic gradient in a
distributed environment.
Neuron is the smallest information carrier in the neural
network structure. In the neural network, we choose to convert
each neuron parameter gradient vector into a unit vector. So
the single-layer neural network parameter is updated to









where θk represents the k-th column or k-th row of the param-
eter matrix in the fully connected layer or convolutional layer
(the convolution kernel is regarded as a neuron). In the fully
connected layer, ∇θ`(θ;x(i:i+n); y(i:i+n))k is expressed as the
k-th column of the gradient matrix. And in the convolutional
layer, it represents the k-th row of the gradient matrix of the
convolution kernel. d is the number of rows or columns of
the gradient matrix. Therefore, each row or column of the
gradient matrix is a unit vector. Then we obtain an average
gradient matrix by using m such gradient matrices to update
the parameters.
B. The safety of SSGD
By analyzing the multi-layer neural network with relu acti-
vation function on a training sample, the following relationship







iW i−1 · · ·W 0X)([WH ]Tc DH · · ·W i+1Di+1)
(9)
where X is the input data, gc represents the c-th dimension of
the loss vector g, Di is the activation pattern of the i-th neural
network, and G
i
and W i denote the gradients and parameters
of the i-th layer of neural network, respectively.
The data reconstruction attack is to solve the above equa-
tions. Zhu et al. [4], [7], [8] used brute force training to
approximate the training sample x. Pan et al. [9] inferred gc
and Di, and then solved the equation to get x and y. In theory,
this scheme is more accurate than previous work. The left side
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Each column is a unit vector, and µik is the modulus length
of the k-th column vector of the i-th layer gradient matrix,
i.e., the modulus length of the k-th neuron gradient of the i-
th layer neural network. Essentially, the parameter matrix of
a layer of neural network is multiplied by a diagonal matrix
U i on the right, and the value of the diagonal matrix is the
reciprocal of the modulus length of the gradient vector of each
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(12)
where U i is not uniquely determined when the loss function
are non-convex and non-concave functions. According to [21],
we know that the loss function of multi-layer neural networks
are non-convex and non-concave functions. Due to the dynam-
icity of U i, even if gc and Di are known, the equations are
not solved.
Our method hides the correlation between the gradient and
the sample, eliminates the information between neurons and
achieves neuron-level security. SSGD make the data recon-
struction attack be invalid for single sample gradient update. It
has no effect on single-layer perceptron. In the case of multiple






















i + b) (14)
xjk cannot be obtained by solving these equations.
How safe is SSGD method? In a distributed multi-layer
neural network, the data will not be leaked by exchanging
unit gradient vectors. For multiple samples, our SSGD can
prevent the collusion attack. Assuming that n−1 of n neuron
gradients are known, the another neuron gradient value is not
inferred. That is, given the unit vector Ĝ and any vector
Gn−1 =
∑n−1
i=1 Gi with the relations G = Gn−1 + Gn
and Ĝ = G‖G‖ , Gn is not obtained. Since the samples are
independent and the gradients have a bijective relationship
with the samples, so the gradients are also independent. In
two dimensional space, the problem is described as follows.
As shown in Fig. 2, given the unit vector
−→
oβ of a vector −→oγ
and the vector −→oα, assume that −→oγ = −→oα+−→αγ, we see whether
−→αγ is obtained. From Fig. 2, we can know that any point γ
on the ray oγ may be the solution of the problem, so −→αγ is
not solved.
Fig. 2. Illustrate the safety of unit vectors by vector graphs
Since training a model requires rounds of iterations, is it safe
to use multiple rounds of iterations? We previously analyzed
that the gradient g and the training data (x, y) are bijective
in terms of parameter θ, then g = f(θ|(x, y)), where f is
a functional relationship. We use θi and θi+1 to denote the
training parameters of the i-th and i+1-th rounds, respectively.
Then we have θi+1 = θi − η · gi. The i-th gradient gi =
f(θi|(x, y)) and the i + 1-th gradient gi+1 = f(θi+1|(x, y)).
So we have θi+1 = θi − η · f(θi|(x, y)). Furthermore, we
obtian gi+1 = f(θi−η·f(θi|(x, y))|(x, y)). By compared gi+1
with gi, we can see that there is not additional information in
gi+1. So the iteration operation does not cause the information
leakage.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Since Lenet-5 [22] is a classic convolutional neural network
model, we use it to test the performance of our approach by
substituting SSGD for basic gradient descents. The Lenet-5
contains two convolutional layers, two pooling layers, and
three fully connected layers. The activation function is relu.
The input dimensions are 784, and output dimensions are
10. The MINST data set is used for testing the accuracy
and robustness of our SSGD approach. It contains 60000
training images and 10000 test images, every image is an
28*28 grayscale image, and each pixel is an octet. The
accuracy contains training and test accuracies. We use 60000
training images to train model. The training (test) accuracy
is the average value of ten experimental results, and every
experiment obtains the average training (test) accuracy of
randomly selecting 1000 samples from the training (test) set.
A. Accuracy
We compare SSGD with SGD, SGDm [23] and Adam [24],
which are widely used gradient descent algorithms. The batch
size N is set to 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096,
8192, and the number of iterations is 10,000. Because SGD
and SGDm have poor adaptability in large batches, there is no
fixed learning rate. The learning rate of Adam is set to 0.005.
The momentum of SGDm is set to 0.999, and the β1 and β2
in Adam are set to 0.9 and 0.999, respectively. For SSGD, the
learning rate in this experiment is set to 0.1, which is relatively
rough. n is set to 1, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128. m is set to 4, 8, 16,
32, 64. When m=1, it is the MBGD. The number of iterations
is also 10,000.
TABLE I
THE TRAINING ACCURACY OF COMPARED ALGORITHMS
N SGD SGDm Adam SSGD
16 0.9759(0.0005) 0.9737(0.0005) 0.9786 0.9778
32 0.9802(0.0005) 0.9776(0.0005) 0.9852 0.9787
64 0.9932(0.0005) 0.9883(0.0005) 0.9913 0.98
128 0.981(0.0005) 0.9907(0.0005) 0.9949 0.9899
256 0.9959(0.0001) 0.9981(0.0005) 0.9935 0.9978
512 0.9811(0.0001) 0.9897(0.0005) 0.9963 0.9998
1024 0.9831(0.00001) 0.9899(0.0001) 0.9994 0.9976
2048 0.9945(0.00001) 0.9997(0.0001) 1 0.9955
4096 0.9878(0.00001) 0.9907(0.0001) 0.9995 0.999
8192 0.9961(0.000002) 0.9852(0.0001) 0.9999 0.9997
TABLE II
THE TEST ACCURACY OF COMPARED ALGORITHMS
N SGD SGDm Adam SSGD
16 0.9781 0.9778 0.9767 0.9675
32 0.9702 0.9768 0.985 0.9816
64 0.9794 0.9792 0.9842 0.9857
128 0.9676 0.978 0.9896 0.9895
256 0.9755 0.9804 0.9855 0.9891
512 0.9665 0.9789 0.9814 0.9874
1024 0.9738 0.9749 0.9778 0.9869
2048 0.9763 0.9717 0.9894 0.9886
4096 0.9703 0.9806 0.9788 0.9878
8192 0.9785 0.8994 0.9753 0.984
The comparative experimental results of SGD, SGDm,
Adam and SSGD are shown in Table I and Table II. In
Table I, the the number in bracket is learning rate. Table III
and Table IV include the running results our SSGD approach.
From Table III, we can see that the larger n is, the better the
training accuracy is. And m does not have much influence on
the training accuracy. For the test accuracy, it is not better as n
increases. When n is 32 or 64, the test accuracy is better. Small
batches may lead to that the model is not be fully trained.
However, when n is greater than 8, it can be seen that the
value of m has a special impact on the test accuracy. It is not
high in the middle and low on both sides. On the contrary,
it is high on both sides and low in the middle. We still do
not know what caused it. From Table II, the performance of
our algorithm is better than SGD and SGDm. When the batch
size is larger than 32, and our SSGD is equivalent to Adam
on test accuracy. However, in the case of very large batches
(greater than 4096), the Adam algorithm is over-fitting, and
the test accuracy is significantly reduced. Our algorithm on
test accuracy is better than Adam.
TABLE III
TRAINING ACCURACY OF SSGD
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64 n = 128
m = 4 0.9474 0.9778 0.9787 0.9928 0.9899 0.9978 0.9998
m = 8 0.9558 0.9722 0.98 0.9892 0.9912 0.9978 0.9999
m = 16 0.9581 0.9788 0.9832 0.9878 0.9927 0.9976 0.9999
m = 32 0.9546 0.9749 0.9844 0.9891 0.9923 0.9996 1
m = 64 0.9606 0.9742 0.9814 0.9884 0.9955 0.999 0.9997
TABLE IV
TEST ACCURACY OF SSGD
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64 n = 128
m = 4 0.9476 0.9675 0.9816 0.9846 0.9895 0.9891 0.9874
m = 8 0.9591 0.9743 0.9857 0.9829 0.9855 0.9861 0.9843
m = 16 0.9604 0.9743 0.9828 0.9832 0.9861 0.9869 0.9832
m = 32 0.9632 0.9765 0.9806 0.9805 0.9819 0.9867 0.9828
m = 64 0.9743 0.9714 0.9833 0.9839 0.9886 0.9878 0.984
The convergence speeds about training and test accuracies
are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively. The value in
longitudinal axis is the average accuracy of every 10 itera-
tions. The SSGDm is SSGD with momentum. We choose the
intermediate value 256 as the batch number in the convergence
experiment, where n = 16 and m = 16 for SSGD and
SSGDm. The learning rates of SGD and SGDm are 0.0001
and 0.0005, respectively. The momentum of SGDm is set to
0.999. The learning rate of SSGDm is 10/1.0002t, where t is
the number of iterations, and its momentum is 0.99. The other
parameters are consistent with the above experiment. From
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we can see that the convergence speed of
our algorithm is faster and more stable than SGD , SGDm and
Adam.
Fig. 3. The convergence speed of training accuracy
Fig. 4. The convergence speed of test accuracy
B. Robustness
To check the robustness of our algorithm, we add random
noise to the gradient. At the same time, we noticed that
differential privacy is a way to protect gradient information
by adding random noise that meets a certain distribution. To
measure the performances of our algorithm and the model with
differential privacy to protect gradient. We set privacy budget
ε = 4. Different from cutting gradient value in [20], we strictly
define sensitivity as the maximum value minus the minimum
value in the gradient matrix.
We use SGDm and Adam as the compared algorithms.
Also, we have tested SGD algorithm. When ε = 5 and the
batch number is large, the gradient explosion will occur and
the SGD can not be converged. SGDm and Adam algorithms
have better robustness. We adjust hyperparameters to get more
TABLE V
TRAINING ACCURACY OF SGDM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.8386 0.8855 0.9365 0.9575 0.9636 0.9597
m = 8 0.8791 0.9374 0.9413 0.9596 0.9533 0.9791
m = 16 0.8825 0.9428 0.9434 0.9645 0.9711 0.9785
m = 32 0.887 0.927 0.949 0.9685 0.9733 0.9764
m = 64 0.8775 0.9248 0.9523 0.965 0.9807 0.9796
TABLE VI
TEST ACCURACY OF SGDM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.8671 0.8714 0.9299 9508 0.9559 0.9518
m = 8 0.8732 0.9242 0.9337 0.9582 0.9569 0.9625
m = 16 0.883 0.9471 0.939 0.9662 0.9674 0.9699
m = 32 0.9023 0.9203 0.9333 0.9594 0.9647 0.9758
m = 64 0.8765 0.9163 0.9514 0.956 0.971 0.9678
performance for SGDm and Adam with differential privacy.
For SGDm, the learning rate is 0.01, and momentum is
0.99. For Adam, the learning rate is 0.001, β1 = 0.9, and
β2 = 0.999. To make SGDm, Adam and SSGD experiments
in the same environment, the batch number is set to n ×m.
n is set to 1, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and m is set to 4, 8, 16,
32, 64. For each iteration, after the n vectors are added, the
Laplace noise of ε = 4 that strictly meets the differential
privacy is added. The sensitivity is set to the maximum value
minus the minimum value of the gradient matrix of the same
batch. Then we use SGDm and Adam algorithms to update
their parameters, respectively. The number of iterations is
10,000. By comparing Table. III, Table IV, Table V, Table VI,
Table VII and Table VIII, we can see that the training and test
accuracies of SSGD are obviously better than that of SGDm
and Adam with different privacy.
TABLE VII
TRAINING ACCURACY TABLE OF ADAM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.9337 0.9314 0.9525 0.9618 0.9706 0.9793
m = 8 0.9342 0.9423 0.9581 0.9659 0.9768 0.9847
m = 16 0.9385 0.9646 0.9748 0.9777 0.9831 0.9936
m = 32 0.9473 0.9614 0.9738 0.9834 0.9883 0.9976
m = 64 0.9543 0.9627 0.9824 0.9897 0.9968 0.9994
TABLE VIII
TEST ACCURACY TABLE OF ADAM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.9356 0.9321 0.9515 9592 0.9567 0.9715
m = 8 0.9223 0.957 0.9657 0.9737 0.9569 0.9797
m = 16 0.9481 0.9607 0.9606 0.9723 0.9726 0.9796
m = 32 0.9365 0.958 0.9693 0.9658 0.9763 0.9806
m = 64 0.9613 0.9545 0.9771 0.9715 0.9702 0.9833
Now, we use SSGDm to verify the robustness of our algo-
rithm. For our algorithm, we use the average of multiple unit
gradient vectors to update the gradient. Therefore, the module
length of the update gradient vector decreases very slowly,
and dynamic learning rates need to be set. The learning rate
of SSGDm is set to 10/1.0002t, momentum = 0.99, where
t is the number of iterations. We use the same batch settings
and the same noise-added methods with ε = 4 as SGDm and
Adam. Then we use SSGDm to update the parameters. The
number of iterations is 10,000.
TABLE IX
TRAINING ACCURACY OF SSGDM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.9557 0.976 0.9779 0.9872 0.9819 0.9904
m = 8 0.957 0.9762 0.9786 0.9858 0.9858 0.9936
m = 16 0.9522 0.9781 0.9847 0.9883 0.9893 0.9966
m = 32 0.9559 0.9807 0.9846 0.9911 0.9927 0.9975
m = 64 0.9548 0.9814 0.9849 0.9878 0.9954 0.997
TABLE X
TEST ACCURACY OF SSGDM WITH DIFFERENT PRIVACY
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
m = 4 0.9552 0.973 0.9816 0.9822 0.9774 0.9851
m = 8 0.9668 0.9785 0.9829 0.979 0.9832 0.9802
m = 16 0.9495 0.9684 0.9839 0.9833 0.9844 0.986
m = 32 0.9594 0.978 0.9805 0.9859 0.9838 0.9837
m = 64 0.9659 0.9772 0.9861 0.9847 0.9853 0.9885
From Table V to Table X, we can see that SSGDm is more
robust than the Sgdm and Adam algorithms when the same
amount of noise is added in training and test accuracy. From
the experimental results, all three algorithms comply with the
law of acquaintance, i.e., the larger the batch size is, the
better the accuracy is. By Comparing Table IV, although the
Laplace noise of ε = 4 is added in SSGDm, its performance
is comparable to that of SSGD without noise.
Where is the limit of the robustness of our algorithm? We
try to increase the amount of noise and take ε equal to 0.2,
0.5, 1, 2, 4. The experimental environment is the same as the
robustness experiment above, and the parameter settings are
also the same. The batch number is set to n = 16 and m = 16.
TABLE XI
THE TRAINING ACCURACIES BY VARYING ε
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 2 ε = 4
SGDm 0.3835 0.8282 0.9366 0.9645
Adam 0.7937 0.8755 0.9131 0.9499 0.9777
SSGDm 0.8467 0.9104 0.9608 0.9753 0.9883
TABLE XII
TEST ACCURACIES BY VARYING ε
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 2 ε = 4
SGDm 0.3745 0.8166 0.9344 0.9662
Adam 0.8074 0.8813 0.914 0.9416 0.9723
SSGDm 0.8481 0.9395 0.9671 0.9719 0.9833
From Table XI and Table XII, it is clear that our SSGDm
has obvious advantages in robustness. The greater the amount
of noise is, the more obvious the robustness is. Compared with
Adam and SGDm, the average test accuracies are increased by
3.87% and 19.25%, respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposes a new gradient descent approach,
called super stochastic gradient descent. The SSGD enhances
the randomness of gradients to protect against gradient-based
attacks. Simultaneously, we use multi-sample aggregation to
enhance stability and eliminate the uncertainty brought about
by ultra-randomness. Our approach achieves neuron-level se-
curity and can defend against data reconstruction attacks. Ex-
perimental results demonstrate that SSGD has good accuracy
and strong robustness because its stability and randomness
are enhanced. In the future, we will extend our idea to other
machine learning models.
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VI. APPENDIX
The experimental code comes from:
https://github.com/PatrickZH/Improved-Deep-Leakage-
from-Gradients. The following experimental diagrams include
the experimental results of DLG [7] and iDLG [4] attacking
the existing gradient descent method and SSGD algorithm
on MINST datasets and CIFAR100 datasets. From the
experimental results, we can see that our algorithm can
defend against DLG [7] and iDLG [4].
Fig. 5. DLG on MINST dataset
Fig. 6. iDLG on MINST dataset
Fig. 7. DLG with SSGD on MINST dataset
Fig. 8. iDLG with SSGD on MINST dataset
Fig. 9. DLG on CIFAR100 dataset Fig. 10. DLG with SSGD on CIFAR100 dataset
Fig. 11. iDLG on CIFAR100 dataset Fig. 12. iDLG with SSGD on CIFAR100 dataset
